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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3924 
___________ 
 
RICHARD MICHREKA NYAMWANGE, 
 
       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
                    Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A029-043-107) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter A. Durling 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 22, 2012 
 
Before:  SMITH, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 12, 2012) 
___________ 
 
O P I N I O N 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Richard Michreka Nyamwange, a citizen of Kenya, was admitted to the United 
States as a lawful permanent resident in 1988.  In 2008, after a jury trial in the 
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Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas at Monroe County, he was convicted of sexual 
assault in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3124.1 and aggravated indecent assault without 
consent in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3125(a)(1).  He was sentenced to a term of 
two and a half to five years in prison for the former offense and five years of probation 
for the latter.  Subsequently, the Government charged Nyamwange as removable as an 
alien convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (relating 
to rape), and in 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(43)(F) (a crime of violence, as set forth in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 16, for which the alien received a sentence of at least one year in prison).  Ultimately,
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the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) held that Nyamwange was removable on the 
basis that his sexual assault offense under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3124.1 was a categorical 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(43)(F).   
 Nyamwange appeals.  Our jurisdiction is circumscribed because Nyamwange is 
removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C).  However, we retain jurisdiction over constitutional claims and 
questions of law, including the main question at issue in this appeal, namely, whether 
Nyamwange was convicted of an aggravated felony.  See Pierre v. Attorney Gen. of the 
United States, 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D)). 
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 As the parties are aware, the procedural history of this case before this agency 
was not uneventful.  However, we will not recount the history in detail, for it is not 
relevant to the outcome of this case.   
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 Pertinent to our analysis is Nyamwange’s conviction for sexual assault, for which 
he received a sentence of more than one year in prison.   He was convicted under a statute 
that provides that “. . . a person commits a felony of the second degree when that person 
engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant without 
the complainant’s consent.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3124.1.  We have already analyzed this 
statute in detail and concluded that a conviction under it constitutes a crime of violence 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).  
See Aguilar v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 663 F.3d 692, 700-04 (3d Cir. 2011).  
We reject Nyamwange’s arguments to the contrary (including his arguments about why 
he believes our decision in Aguilar is incorrect, see Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 
854, 858 (3d Cir. 1996) (explaining that a panel of the court is bound by a published 
decision of a prior panel absent intervening authority or amendments to the relevant 
statutes or regulations)).  Accordingly, we hold that the BIA did not err in ruling that 
Nyamwange was removable.  We will deny the petition for review.
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 We also have considered Nyamwange’s arguments about the Government’s 
alleged waiver or abandonment, during the administrative proceedings, of the charge on 
which Nyamwange was found removable.  We conclude that the arguments are without 
merit.  We review the decision of the BIA, which ruled on the charge (which the 
Government had included in the notice to appear).  The BIA has been delegated authority 
by the Attorney General, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1, who is the respondent in this case, and 
who is charged with the administration and enforcement of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, see 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).  Furthermore, we are unaware of any 
authority that holds that any deficiency in briefing by the Government during the 
administrative process requires an Immigration Judge, the BIA, or us to deem a charge 
waived or abandoned.   
